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Abstract
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine aspects of the representational and
computational influences on Bayesian reasoning as they relate to reference dependence. Across
three studies, I explored how dependence on the initial problem structure influences the ability to
solve Bayesian reasoning tasks. Congruence between the problem and question of interest,
response errors, and individual differences in numerical abilities was assessed. The most
consistent and surprising finding in all three experiments was that people were much more likely
to utilize the superordinate value as part of their solution rather than the anticipated reference
class values. This resulted in a weakened effect of congruence, with relatively low accuracy
even in congruent conditions, as well as a different pattern of response errors than what was
anticipated. There was consistent and strong evidence of a value selection bias in that incorrect
responses almost always conformed to values that were provided in the problem rather than
errors related to computation. The one notable exception occurred when no organizing
information was available in the problem, other than the instruction to consider a sample of the
same size as that in the problem. In that case, participants were most apt to sum all of the subsets
of the sample to yield the size of the original sample (N). In all three experiments, higher
numerical skills were generally associated with higher accuracy, whether calculations were
required or not.
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Reference Dependence in Bayesian Reasoning
Diagnostic tests are used in many domains to help distinguish who has or does not have a
condition of interest. However, these tests are not perfect, so a positive test result does not
always correspond to the presence of a condition. From an individual’s standpoint, knowing the
likelihood that a positive test result indicates the presence of a condition is an important piece of
information that would be helpful to know. This is the positive predictive value (PPV) of the
test, which compares the subset of those who have the condition and test positive (C+T+) to all
of those who test positive (T+).
These types of tests are commonly presented as Bayesian reasoning problems, which are
used to evaluate the ability to update prior beliefs based on additional evidence in order to
determine a posterior probability. Research over the last 40 years demonstrates that uninitiated
reasoners, as well as novice reasoners, tend to have difficulty working through these types of
problems to correctly determine the PPV (e.g., Gigerenzer, Gaissmaier, Kurz-Milcke, Schwartz,
& Woloshin, 2007; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; Hoffrage, Krauss, Martignon, & Gigerenzer,
2015; Johnson & Tubau, 2015; Reyna & Brainerd, 2008; Sirota, Kostovičová, & ValléeTourangeau, 2015).
Factors that have been associated with the low accuracy rates observed in Bayesian
reasoning tasks are broadly categorized as representational or computational difficulties (Johnson
& Tubau, 2015; Talboy & Schneider, 2018a, 2018b). Difficulties with how the problem is
cognitively represented by reasoners are typically attributed to how the components of the
problem relate to each other, which is not readily apparent in some formulations of the problem.
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Although many researchers have attempted various manipulations to encourage reasoners to be
aware of and understand the nested structure of the problem, accuracy still falls short and is not
consistent across manipulations (Brase, 2014; Garcia-Retamero, Cokely, & Hoffrage, 2015;
Sirota, Kostovičová, & Juanchich, 2014; Sirota et al., 2015). This representational issue is
compounded by the computational difficulties of extracting and computing the value needed to
determine the PPV from the information provided in the problem (Cosmides & Tooby, 1996;
Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; Macchi, 2000). The computational difficulties are especially
apparent for those who struggle with numerical concepts compared to those who have stronger
numerical skills (Chapman & Liu, 2009; Reyna & Brainerd, 2008; Schwartz, Woloshin, Black,
& Welch, 1997; Talboy & Schneider, 2018b).
I propose that many of the representational and computational difficulties associated with
Bayesian reasoning tasks are due in part to reference dependence, or the tendency to adopt a
given or implied reference point at the start of cognitive deliberations. The contextual
structuring provided by the problem description gives uninitiated reasoners a starting point from
which to evaluate the values in order to work toward a solution. Across a variety of different
types of problem solving, research suggests that inexperienced reasoners will often rely on the
problem structure and organization to guide their approach to solution (Chi, Glaser, & Rees,
1981; Talboy & Schneider, 2018a). Relying on that structure can be problematic when the
structure presents information in a way that is not consistent with the question being asked. I
propose that this reference dependence is a major factor in the solutions that reasoners generate
when trying to solve Bayesian reasoning problems.
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine aspects of the representational and
computational influences on Bayesian reasoning as they relate to reference dependence. Across
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three studies, I explored how dependence on the initial problem structure influences the ability to
solve Bayesian reasoning tasks. I also evaluated the interplay of adopting a specified reference
point when other representational and computational factors are manipulated. Finally, I looked
at how individual differences in numerical skill connect to these larger issues.
Bayesian Reasoning Problems
Bayesian reasoning problems are used to assess one’s ability to determine the likelihood
of having a condition given a positive test result. Reasoners are often asked to determine this
positive predictive value (PPV) based on three pieces of information: the base rate of the
condition within a given population or sample, the true positive rate (indicating those who have
the condition and test positive), and the false positive rate (indicating those who do not have the
condition but test positive).
One of the first formulations of Bayesian reasoning problems was presented using singleevent probabilities for each of the numeric values, which indicates the chance of some event
happening without specifying a particular reference class. In this numeric format, the PPV is
calculated as a conditional probability using Bayes Theorem. Accuracy was generally very poor
(around 15%), with the highest reported accuracy around 30% in the absence of training or other
aids (e.g., Casscells, Schoenberger, & Graboys, 1978; Cosmides & Tooby, 1996; Eddy, 1982;
Galesic et al., 2009; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; Sirota, Juanchich, & Hagmayer, 2014;
Sloman, Over, Slovak, & Stibel, 2003).
One of the largest breakthroughs in improving Bayesian reasoning has come through
representing the numeric information as natural frequencies instead of single-event probabilities
(e.g., Garcia-Retamero & Hoffrage, 2013; Gigerenzer, Gaissmaier, Kurz-Milcke, Schwartz, &
Woloshin, 2007; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995). Natural frequencies provide counts of
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occurrences, indicating the total number of events in relation to a reference class of a specified
size, as demonstrated using the classic mammography problem, shown below:
10 out of every 1,000 women at age forty who participate in routine screening
have breast cancer. 8 of every 10 women with breast cancer will get a positive
mammography. 95 out of every 990 women without breast cancer will also get a
positive mammography.
Q: Here is a new representative sample of women at age forty who got a positive
mammography in routine screening. How many of these women do you expect to
actually have breast cancer? ___ out of ___
In each statement, the target subgroup is defined in relation to a specified reference class using
integer values. In this format, the PPV is calculated as a joint probability using a simplified form
of Bayes Theorem rather than the more difficult conditional probability algorithm (Gigerenzer &
Hoffrage, 1995).
When Bayesian reasoning problems are presented in this manner, around 40% of
participants typically determine the correct solution in the absence of training (e.g., Brase, 2014;
Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; Micallef, Dragicevic, Fekete, & Assessing, 2012; Sirota et al.,
2014). Despite this dramatic improvement with natural frequencies, though, well over half of
participants across studies still struggle to determine the correct solution to Bayesian reasoning
problems. Many of the remaining difficulties associated with this task can be categorized as
representational issues and computational issues (Johnson & Tubau, 2015).
Representation
One of the biggest difficulties associated with correctly determining the solution for
Bayesian reasoning problems is identifying the correct reference class for PPV. To do this
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requires understanding the nested structure of the problem as well as the subset-set relationships
between the components of the problem (e.g., Barbey & Sloman, 2007; Brase & Hill, 2017;
Girotto & Pighin, 2015; Sirota, Juanchich, et al., 2014). To demonstrate, Table 1 shows how the
nested values of a traditional Bayesian reasoning problem are organized using a contingency
table. The sections presented with no shading indicate which values are typically included in
traditional presentations, such as the subset of those who test positive and have the condition
(C+T+) and the subset of those who do not have the condition and test positive (C-T+). The
grayed boxes indicate values that could be elucidated but are often not, such as the
complementary subsets of those who test negative (C+T- and C-T-). The most critical of these
for PPV is the total of those who test positive (T+). This value is needed to determine the
reference class or denominator for the PPV.
Table 1. Bayesian Reasoning Task Values Organized in a 2x2 Contingency Table
TEST POSITIVE

TEST NEGATIVE

Marginal
Totals

CONDITION
POSITIVE

Condition Positive and
Test Positive (C+T+)

Condition Positive and
Test Negative (C+T-)

Total Condition
Positive (C+)

CONDITION
NEGATIVE

Condition Negative and
Test Positive (C-T+)

Condition Negative and
Test Negative (C-T+)

Total Condition
Negative (C-)

Marginal
Totals

Total Test Positive (T+)

Total Test Negative (T-)

Superordinate
Set (N)

Some researchers have created external aids, such as icon arrays or mosaic plots that
visually demonstrate the nested relationship of all four subsets (e.g., Brase, 2014; GarciaRetamero & Hoffrage, 2013; Sirota, Kostovičová, & Juanchich, 2014). Others have designed
elaborate training programs that teach reasoners how to represent the nested structure and the setsubset relationships (Kurzenhäuser & Hoffrage, 2002; Navarrete & Mandel, 2016; Sedlmeier &
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Gigerenzer, 2001; Talboy & Schneider, 2017). However, these types of interventions have had
limited success (see Brust-Renck, Royer, & Reyna, 2013; Gaissmaier et al., 2012) and are often
not available in the applied situations where Bayesian reasoning problems are typically
encountered.
In these applied situations, it may be more practical to manipulate the information that is
presented within the problem itself instead of relying on an external aid to elucidate the nested
components of the problem. As shown above, the verbal presentations do not include all of the
entries relevant to the diagnostic test. It has been widely demonstrated that untrained reasoners
tend to create mental representations of a problem based, often exclusively, on the information
that is provided within the problem (Johnson-Laird, 1994; Kintsch & Greeno, 1985; Sirota,
Juanchich, et al., 2014).
In the case of Bayesian reasoning problems presented in the standard format, this
suggests that reasoners are likely to encode only the subset information that is provided in the
problem text rather than all possible subsets. Because of this, they may not even recognize the
nested set structure inherent in the problem. By providing a verbal presentation that includes all
of the component parts of the contingency matrix, reasoners may be more likely to develop a
more complete mental model of the problem that helps them understand and manipulate values
within the nested structure to determine the correct solution.
Experiment 1 was designed to test whether providing complete subset information will
facilitate the appropriate representation of the problems. This manipulation also provides a
baseline for comparison for manipulations introduced in Experiments 2 and 3. In order to get
uninitiated reasoners to appreciate the structure of the problem, I created a problem formulation
that includes all four possible (conjoint) subsets to verbally fill all four cells of the nested
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structure to move closer to what is accomplished by visual aids or training. By expanding the
amount of information available in the problem text, reasoners may be in a better position to
recognize the structure of the problem and build a more complete mental model, which may in
turn increase ability to correctly identify the PPV.
Computation
Although the inclusion of full subset information may improve the mental model
reasoners create based on the problem presentation, this does little to address the computational
difficulties associated with combining values to determine the correct marginal reference class
needed for the PPV question. Responses to the PPV question may be elicited as a pair of
integers (i.e., ___ out of ___ people) wherein the numerator is the subset of interest (C+T+) and
the denominator is the total reference class (T+) to which the subset is compared. This is
referred to as a frequency response format, which requires a single calculation (addition) to
determine the denominator. Alternatively, responses may be elicited as a percentage value (i.e.,
___%) wherein the two values needed for the frequency response format are combined through
division. This is referred to as a percentage response format.
Although some argue that these computations are simple because they involve basic
arithmetic operations like adding or dividing (Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, Girotto, Legrenzi, &
Caverni, 1999; Sloman et al., 2003), there is substantial evidence that many reasoners are unable
to complete the computations required to correctly solve Bayesian reasoning problems (Johnson
& Tubau, 2015; Mayer, 2003; Reyna & Brainerd, 2008; cf. Talboy & Schneider, in progress).
Often, reasoners tend to select values directly from the problem as their denominator for the
frequency response format instead of calculating the value needed (Cosmides & Tooby, 1996;
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Galesic et al., 2009; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, & Kleinbölting, 1991;
Talboy & Schneider, 2017, 2018a; Wolfe, Fisher, & Reyna, 2013).
There are two potential explanations for this particular component response error. First,
reasoners may be dependent on how the problem information is structured, which leads them to
utilize the reference class totals that are focused on in the problem, even when they are not
appropriate for reaching the solution. Alternatively, reasoners may have a general bias toward
selecting values from the problem for their solution or for assuming that their task is to find the
needed value from within the problem. Both of these possibilities are also consistent with a bias
toward cognitive ease (Kahneman, 2011), which favors a readily available answer over even
seemingly innocuous arithmetic steps such as adding two values together. As Ayal and BeythMarom (2014) have shown, accurate performance in solving probability-based reasoning
problems drops off dramatically as the need for computations increases.
There is more to computation than just the arithmetic required to add or divide two
integer values. In problem solving, computation involves the cognitive processes of
conceptualizing what is needed for solution, selecting relevant values from the problem, and
applying the appropriate values toward solution. Only then does the ability to perform the
correct arithmetic step enter into consideration. Computation in this sense involves a preexisting
body of knowledge to enable recognition of which mathematical operation is appropriate for the
question being asked. It also involves analytic abilities to correctly interpret the meaning of the
provided numbers within the context of the problem in addition to figuring out where to include
the values in the operation itself before actually completing the arithmetic step. Errors at any
point during this process can contribute to incorrect computations, and as a result, incorrect
solutions (Talboy & Schneider, 2018a).
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Difficulties with computations are especially apparent for those with low numeracy
compared to those with higher numeracy (Chapman & Liu, 2009; Reyna & Brainerd, 2008;
Schwartz et al., 1997; Talboy & Schneider, 2017, 2018b). Numeracy is the ability to work with
and understand numbers in various numeric formats (Peters et al., 2006; Peters, Hibbard, Slovic,
& Dieckmann, 2007). Those who experience more difficulty working with numeric information
tend to perform worse on reasoning tasks than those who have higher numeracy (GarciaRetamero & Galesic, 2010; Hill & Brase, 2012; Johnson & Tubau, 2013; Lipkus, Samsa, &
Rimer, 2001; Peters et al., 2006; Schwartz, Woloshin, & Welch, 2005).
Experiment 2 was designed to separate out the extent to which reasoners utilize numeric
values as they are presented in the problem text versus completing necessary computations to
determine the correct solution. I created problem formulations that do not require computation
of the denominator to determine the correct response to compare to problems that do require
computation. Comparing accuracy on these two problem formulations will help determine
whether reasoners are more likely to select an inappropriate value from the problem to apply as
the denominator in the solution, or whether they can be encouraged to complete computations to
determine the correct denominator. For each problem formulation, I will also look at the role of
numeracy in relation to accuracy.
Reference Dependence
A major proposition of this work is that many of the problems associated with the
representation and computational components of Bayesian problem solving are tied to the
cognitive process of reference dependence. Reference dependence is the tendency to start
cognitive deliberations from a given or indicated reference point. Representational and
computational difficulties are compounded when the problem starts from one reference point and
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the question asks reasoners to assess the information from another reference point (Johnson &
Tubau, 2013; Pighin, Tentori, Savadori, & Girotto, 2018; Talboy & Schneider, 2018a, 2018b).
In particular, the traditional Bayesian reasoning problem presents information within a
condition nesting (C+ and C-), which provides a framework in which reasoners can organize the
subset information. However, they are standardly asked to evaluate the PPV of the problem,
which asks reasoners to evaluate the subset of interest within a test nesting (T+). Therefore, the
most common presentation of Bayesian reasoning problems partitions the nested sets in a way
that is not congruent with the posterior likelihood of interest (Girotto & Gonzalez, 2001; Pighin
et al., 2018; Talboy & Schneider, 2017, 2018a, 2018b).
To determine the correct solution, reasoners must ignore the reference class totals that are
the focus in the problem in order to calculate the marginal reference class total of all those who
test positive (T+). The presence of a competing reference class total in the problem may cause a
type of processing interference (e.g., Reyna, 2004; Reyna & Brainerd, 2008), which inhibits the
reasoner’s ability to evaluate the problem from the alternate reference point.
Reference dependence is one of the most ubiquitous findings throughout the judgment
and decision making literature. A wealth of research indicates that decisions are highly
dependent on the reference frame used to present choices (e.g., Dinner, Johnson, Goldstein, &
Liu, 2011; Hájek, 2007; Lopes & Oden, 1999; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991), and that many
decision heuristics, such as default and anchoring effects, as well as framing effects can be
explained by reference dependence. Although the majority of research documenting reference
dependence comes from the choice literature, the importance of context in shaping behavior has
also been noted in several other domains, including logical reasoning (Johnson-Laird, 2010),
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problem solving (Kotovsky & Simon, 1990), extensional reasoning (Fox & Levav, 2004)—and
now in Bayesian reasoning as well (Talboy & Schneider, 2018a, 2018b).
In particular, reasoners will often use the reference class that is the focus of the problem
description as a part of their solution instead of calculating the correct reference class needed for
solution. As a result, responses often correspond to the sensitivity of the test (C+T+/C+) instead
of the PPV (C+T+/T+; Cosmides & Tooby, 1996; Galesic et al., 2009; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage,
1995; Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, & Kleinbölting, 1991; Talboy & Schneider, 2017, 2018a; Wolfe,
Fisher, & Reyna, 2013). In Talboy and Schneider (2018a), I found that about one-third of
participants consistently indicated the sensitivity as their response, but also that another one-third
of participants used the condition reference class as the subset of interest in relation to the
superordinate set—another alternative reference class—as their response for the denominator on
the frequency format question.
This critical issue of using the incorrect reference class as part of the solution is often
attributed to representational difficulties, and it may also reflect a bias to avoid computations.
However, I further argue that both the representational and computational difficulty of
identifying the correct reference class is compounded by the fact that reasoners must start
evaluating the problem matrix from a different reference point than the one needed for solution.
I refer to this traditional presentation of Bayesian reasoning problems as the “conditionfocus” presentation because the problem text explicitly uses the presence or absence of the
condition as the reference class in which the subsets are organized and evaluated (Talboy &
Schneider, 2018b, 2018a). These problems can be reorganized to focus on the alternate set of
reference classes, which indicate the total number of people who test positive (T+) or negative
(T-), which includes the reference class that is needed to arrive at the PPV value. I refer to this
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form as a “test-focus” presentation (Talboy & Schneider, 2018b, 2018a). By changing the
organization and focus of the problem, I am manipulating the reference structure that reasoners
are likely to rely on to answer the PPV question. These two problem forms are shown in Table 2
using the mammography example.
Table 2. Example Presentations with Partial Subset Information for the Mammography Problem
Condition-Focus (CF)
In this sample of 10,000 women, 100 have
breast cancer.
Of the 100 women who have breast cancer:
80 received a positive result
on their mammogram.

Test-Focus (TF)
In this sample of 10,000 women, 1,070
received a positive result on their
mammogram.
Of the 1,070 women who received a positive
result on their mammogram:
80 have breast cancer.

Of the 9,900 women who do not have
breast cancer:
990 received a positive result
on their mammogram.

Of the 8,930 women who received a negative
result on their mammogram:

Imagine another random sample of 10,000
women who had a mammogram.

Imagine another random sample of 10,000
women who had a mammogram.

20 have breast cancer.

The traditional condition-focus problem presentation presents information in terms of
who has or does not have the condition of interest (C+ and C-, respectively), with additional
information about the subsets of testing positive or negative within the two primary reference
classes. This form of the problem is considered to be incongruent with the PPV question
because each focuses on a different reference class than the T+ class needed for solution.
Research has long called for a manipulation that constructively changes the way in which
reasoners think about and conceptualize these types of problems to improve intuitive judgment
and draw attention to the correct reference class (e.g., Bar-Hillel, 1980; Fischhoff & Bar-Hillel,
1984; Girotto & Gonzalez, 2001; Hoffrage, Hafenbrädl, & Bouquet, 2015).
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Talboy and Schneider (2018a, 2018b) attempted to draw attention to the correct reference
class by changing how information was organized within the problem. Instead of organizing the
subsets of test results into the condition reference classes, I organized the subsets of the
condition’s presence into the reference classes of those who test positive (T+) and those who test
negative (T-). This “test-focus” presentation is congruent with the PPV question as both utilize
the same reference class information structure. A congruent test-focus presentation paired with
the PPV question (congruent) resulted in over 90% of participants routinely determining the
correct solution without any aids compared to less than 30% determining the correct solution on
the incongruent condition-focus problems paired with PPV questions (Talboy & Schneider,
2018a, 2018b). These findings demonstrate that when reasoners evaluate a problem that is
organized to focus on the same information as the diagnostic question of interest, they are able to
consistently identify the correct posterior likelihood of having the condition given a positive test.
The benefit of using a congruent problem-question pairing is attributed to using reference
dependence to ease the difficulties associated with both representation and computation of
solutions (Talboy & Schneider, 2018a). With a congruent pairing, the organization of the
problem information maps directly to the question of interest. Therefore, reasoners do not need
to mentally re-structure the problem to get to the requested solution as they would with an
incongruent problem-question pairing. This also eliminates computational difficulties in the
frequency format because the correct reference class total (i.e., needed denominator) is provided
as a value that can be selected directly from the problem rather than a value that must be
calculated from two component pieces that are split between the alternate set of reference
classes. Therefore, the requirements for solution on the congruent pairing were drastically
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reduced compared to the more traditional incongruent pairing (e.g., Kotovsky & Simon, 1990;
Simon, 1978).
Across all three proposed experiments, I evaluated how reference dependence influences
accuracy by using both congruent and incongruent problem-question pairings. For each pairing,
I assessed how representational and computational difficulties interplay with the effect of
reference class congruence on problem solving, as well as explored the relationship between
these effects with respect to error response patterns and numerical skill.
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Current Research
In the three studies proposed here, I evaluated the extent to which reference dependence,
as well as related representational and computational difficulties, affect accuracy in Bayesian
reasoning. Although each experiment is described separately, all conditions were randomly
assigned simultaneously to enable cross-study comparisons. Across all three proposed
experiments, there is a shared set of general hypotheses, as well as aspects of the stimuli and
materials that was common to all. A map of the conditions across the three experiments is
provided in Appendix A.
General Hypotheses
Bayesian reasoning problems were presented in either congruent or incongruent problemquestion pairings. Congruent test-focus and PPV pairings utilize the same reference class
information in both the problem and diagnostic question of interest, which makes the test-focus
information problem formulation congruent with the PPV question (C+T+/T+). Incongruent
condition-focus and PPV pairings use different reference classes in the problem versus the
question, which creates a mismatch between how information is presented and what is required
to determine the solution. Therefore, because condition-focus problem formulation focuses on
the condition reference classes, it is incongruent with the PPV question that focuses on the test
reference class. Based on the power of reference dependence in the conceptualization of the
problem, as confirmed in our previous research, I proposed the primary general hypothesis:
H1) Congruence hypothesis: Congruent problem-question pairings will result
in higher problem solving accuracy on average than incongruent pairings
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because the same reference structure provided in the problem is required for
solution.
In addition to evaluating reference dependence through the use of congruent and
incongruent problem-question pairings, I also evaluated individual’s response patterns to
determine which types of errors reasoners are making. Error patterns observed in previous
research suggests an identifiable pattern of responses that corresponds to values provided in the
problem text rather than computational mistakes. This led to the second general hypothesis:
H2) Value selection bias hypothesis: Uninitiated reasoners will be more likely
to select values as they are explicitly presented in the problem for their
solution rather than completing computations to determine the correct
response. Therefore, the majority of errors in response patterns will
conform to identifiable values from the problem.
Finally, I evaluated accuracy and response patterns on Bayesian reasoning tasks with
regard to numerical skill. I was specifically interested in those who have the most difficulty on
these types of problems, which requires separating out those with the lowest numerical skillset
from those who demonstrate higher numeracy. This led to the third general hypothesis:
H3) Numeracy hypothesis: In general, those with higher numeracy will
display higher accuracy than those with low numeracy, especially for
problems that require computations compared to problems without
computations.
Shared Stimuli and Measures
Eight Bayesian reasoning problems were used to test participants’ abilities to understand
and calculate the positive predictive value (PPV). Table 3 includes the domain, topic, and
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frequency versions of the base rate, true positive rate, and false positive rate for all eight
problems. I used two problems each from four unique content domains to ensure generalizability
of results across various areas in which diagnostic tests could be encountered.
Table 3. Condition-focus Essential Components of Each Inference Problem
True Positive
False Positive
Base Rate
Rate
Rate
PPV SEN
Domain
Topic
C+
N
(C+T+) | (C+) (C-T+) | (C-)
%
%
Medical Mammogram
100 10,000
80 | 100
990 | 9,900
8
80
Medical Diabetes
50 10,000
48 | 50
4,975 | 9,950
1
96
Legal
Polygraph
50
1,000
47 | 50
47 | 950
37
83
Legal
Recidivism
156
1,000
130 | 156
220 | 844
50
94
Sports
Baseball
185
250
130 | 185
15 | 65
90
70
Sports
Tennis
2,800 10,000 2,000 | 2,800 1,100 | 7,200
65
71
College Employment
140
200
70 | 140
10 | 60
88
50
College Exam Prep
350
500
275 | 350
25 | 150
92
79
Note. Base Rate = the number of condition occurrences (C+) within the specified sample size.
(Test + | Act. +) = the number of people who test positive (correctly) out of the number of people
who are actually positive. (Test + | Act. -) = the number of people who test positive
(erroneously) out of the number of people who are actually negative.
All reasoning problems start with a general preamble about the condition of interest, as
well as the test used for detecting the condition. In each problem, the preamble emphasizes that
the test is not always correct and that specific information regarding correct and incorrect results
is provided in the remaining sections of the problem. The rest of the problem information is
manipulated to conform to either a test-focus or a condition-focus problem presentation, which is
then matched with a congruent or incongruent diagnostic question. An example of each problem
form is provided in Appendix B.
For each problem, participants determined the PPV first as a frequency response and then
as a percentage response immediately after. The frequency response format question asks, “Of
the women from this new sample who test positive, how many do you expect to have breast
cancer?” For this format, answers were given as an open-response requiring the correct
identification of two relevant integer values (___ out of ___ people) provided in the correct
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order. The accuracy score for the frequency format was computed by totaling the number of
correct integer-pair answers across the eight problems. Because minimal or no calculations were
needed to give the correct frequency responses, only exact values were coded as correct. Many
of the hypotheses focus on the frequency response format as it provides a distinction between
values that can be selected directly from the problem (i.e., the numerator) and values that require
computations (i.e, the denominator).
For the percentage answer format, responses were provided using a slider scale ranging
from 0% to 100% to the question “If a woman from this new sample tests positive, what is the
probability that she will have breast cancer?” The accuracy score for the percentage format was
assessed by totaling how many correct estimates are provided on the eight reasoning problems.
Based on previous studies (Galesic et al., 2009; Hoffrage & Gigerenzer, 1998; Talboy &
Schneider, 2017, 2018b, 2018a), responses on the percentage format are coded as correct if the
answer falls within ±5% of the correct response. This range allows for possible rounding errors
that could be made during mental calculations as participants are only provided pencil and paper
in lieu of calculators.
Participants also completed a numeracy scale to assess their level of numerical skill.
Researchers are often unable to make an overarching assessment of numeracy because current
prevalent measures tend to focus on myopic components such as subjective impressions of
personal numerical abilities (Fagerlin et al., 2007), specific computational skills (Cokely et al.,
2012), or understanding of numerical expressions of risk in the form of probabilities or
percentages (Lipkus et al., 2001; Weller et al., 2012). Additionally, results are often clouded by
low reliability in the measure as some of the questions are clearly related to individual
components of numeracy, whereas other map onto specific statistical literacy skills.
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Although an ideal scale has yet to be developed, the Abbreviated Numeracy Scale (ANS;
Weller et al., 2012) has been used in prior studies to distinguish those who have low numeracy
from those who have higher numeracy (Talboy & Schneider, 2018a, 2018b). Therefore, in the
current studies, numeracy was measured using the ANS.
Power Analysis
The three proposed experiments were run contemporaneously, and participants were
randomly assigned to one of 10 possible between-subjects conditions. Power analysis conducted
prior to data collection indicates that these experiments require a minimum of 40 participants per
cell to find smaller main effects (𝜂2 = .06) with a power = .80 and α = .05, and medium-large
simple effects (𝜂2 = .16; Cohen, 1992). The determination of expected effect size was based on
the effects found in previous research for congruence and numeracy (Talboy & Schneider,
2018a, 2018b). In total, 594 participants participated in these studies. However, 5 participants
were removed prior to analysis due to computer issues or incomplete response sets. In total, 589
participants (66% female) completed all study requirements and were included for analyses.
Overview of Proposed Experiments
In Experiment 1, I evaluated how the amount of information provided in the problem
description affects accuracy on Bayesian reasoning tasks. I did this by manipulating the total
number of subsets described explicitly in the problem. By expanding the amount of information
available in the problem text, reasoners may build a more elaborate mental model that better
reflects the structure of the problem (Johnson-Laird, 1994; Kintsch & Greeno, 1985; Sirota,
Juanchich, et al., 2014), which may in turn increase accuracy. However, this might instead make
discrimination of needed values more difficult. This experiment also established a baseline
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measure for accuracy in problems with complete subset information, which is used for
comparative purposes in Experiments 2.
In Experiment 2, I evaluated the role of computation in Bayesian reasoning. In this
study, measuring accuracy and individual differences in response patterns on incongruent
problem-question pairings (i.e., condition-focused problem with PPV question; CF-PPV) allows
the opportunity to evaluate issues related to both incongruent and congruent pairings. First, I
assessed the extent to which incongruent reference class totals introduce processing interference
(e.g., Reyna, 2004) that inhibits uninitiated reasoners’ ability to determine the correct reference
class. I assessed individual response patterns to gauge the general bias toward selecting values
directly from the problem for the solution rather than completing computations.
For the congruent problem-question pairings (i.e., test-focused problem with PPV
question; TF-PPV), I separated out the extent to which an added computation reduces the overall
effect of congruence on accuracy. Again, I assessed individual response patterns to evaluate the
extent to which reasoners are biased toward selecting values from the problem rather than
completing computations. For both incongruent and congruent problem-question pairings,
numerical skill was evaluated with respect to the selection and computation of values needed for
the solution.
In Experiment 3, I introduced a new manipulation of reference dependence to determine
the extent to which reasoners rely on the reference structure provided in the verbal description of
the problem to determine the solution. In both the incongruent and congruent problem-question
pairings, I looked at accuracy and individual differences in response patterns, as well as the
relationship between numeracy and accuracy.
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Each experiment is described separately to allow for assessment of specific hypotheses
within each experiment. Running them contemporaneously, though, allowed for comparisons
across experiments that further clarify the extent to which these three issues are related, and
affect accuracy in Bayesian reasoning. This research was approved by the University of South
Florida’s Institutional Review Board, shown in Appendix C with a copy of the informed consent.
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Experiment 1 – Amount of Information
In each Bayesian reasoning problem, there are four unique subsets of interest (C+T+,
C+T-, C-T+, C-T-). Generally speaking, the research conducted on Bayesian reasoning tends to
utilize problem forms that only present the two subsets that are needed to calculate the PPV
(Brase, 2014; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; Micallef et al., 2012; Sirota, Juanchich, et al., 2014;
Talboy & Schneider, 2018a). Within these condition-focused problems, the subset of those who
test positive is provided within the context of having the condition (C+T+) or not having the
condition (C-T+). The pair of complementary subsets are not typically included.
Findings are mixed regarding whether reasoners are aware that potentially important
subset information is absent from problem presentations. In some cases, people appear to be
insensitive to information that is intentionally left out of problems (Fischhoff, Slovic, &
Lichtenstein, 1978; Hammerton, 1973; McDowell & Jacobs, 2017; McDowell, Rebitschek,
Gigerenzer, & Wegwarth, 2016). In others, reasoners (when asked) may make simple
assumptions about information that they believe should be present but is not (e.g., Hamm, Miller,
& Drillings, 1988). Uninitiated reasoners tend to rely on surface features provided in the
problem to guide how they determine the solution (Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981; Chi, Glaser,
et al., 1981; Owen & Sweller, 1989; Swanson & Beebe-Frankenberger, 2004; Winner, Engel, &
Gardner, 1980). Therefore, responses may conform to surface features made available in the
problem whether this includes full or partial subset information.
Adding full subset information may allow reasoners to create a more complete mental
model of the problem structure by clarifying all of the component parts and implying the
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interrelationships that make up the contingency matrix. With partial presentations, half of the
subsets are not explicitly delineated. Research concerning mental models and conditional
reasoning suggests that this type of implicit information may be encoded into the mental
representation of the problem but in a way that is not immediately accessible for problem solving
(Johnson-Laird, 1994) or it may be completely ignored (Fischhoff et al., 1978; Hammerton,
1973; McDowell & Jacobs, 2017; McDowell et al., 2016). As a result, reasoners tend to rely
more on explicit information because those values are more readily accessible (Johnson-Laird,
1994). Given this, accuracy is expected to increase on problems with full subset compared to
partial subset information (Girotto & Gonzalez, 2001; Johnson-Laird, 1994; Legrenzi & Girotto,
1995; Markovits & Barrouillet, 2002).
When the problem presents all of the component pieces, all of the information is
explicitly available and thus readily accessible for creating a mental structure that can be
manipulated to determine the solution. By having all of the components available, reasoners do
not need to mentally manage as many pieces of information because they are available in the
problem description, making it less likely for reasoning errors to occur (e.g., Markovits &
Barrouillet, 2002). This led to the first hypothesis for amount of information:
H4a) Mental models hypothesis: Complete problem information will result in
higher problem solving accuracy than partial problem information because it
will facilitate the reasoner’s development of a comprehensive mental model
of the problem structure.
However, there is a competing hypothesis for what happens when the amount of
information is manipulated. Instead of increasing accuracy, the inclusion of full subset
information could decrease accuracy because reasoners will need to discriminate among more
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values than they would with partial subset information. In choice tasks, having several options
can be overwhelming because the need to evaluate more information places a larger cognitive
burden on reasoners (Greifeneder, Scheibehenne, & Kleber, 2010; Iyengar & Lepper, 2000;
Johnson et al., 2012). For instance, reasoners may not be able to actively attend to all of the
options provided when full subset information is given compared to when partial subset
information is given (Iyengar & Lepper, 2000). Reasoners may also get confused about which
pieces of information are necessary for solution when they must discriminate among a larger set
of values that are all relevant to developing a deeper understanding of the interrelated problem
structure but are not necessarily needed for solution. This led to the competing hypothesis for
amount of information:
H4b) Discrimination hypothesis: Complete problem information will result in
lower problem solving accuracy than partial problem information because
reasoners will need to discriminate among a larger set of values.
These two experiment-specific hypotheses will be evaluated in conjunction with
the three overarching hypotheses (congruence, value selection bias, and numeracy).
Method
Participants. Experiment 1 included 236 psychology undergraduates who participated
in exchange for extra credit toward a course. Each participant was randomly assigned to one of
four between-subjects conditions.
Design. Experiment 1 used a 2 x 2 Congruence (congruent, incongruent) x Information
(partial subsets, full subsets) between-subjects design. The primary dependent variable was
accuracy on the PPV question in the frequency response format (___ out of ___ people).
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Bayesian reasoning problems were presented as either congruent or incongruent problemquestion pairings. Congruent test-focus problems with PPV question pairings utilized the same
reference class information to structure the problem and diagnostic question of interest.
Incongruent condition-focus problems with PPV question pairings used different reference
classes to structure the problem and question, which created a mismatch between how
information was presented and what was required to determine the solution.
In typical Bayesian problem presentations, only partial subset information is provided (as
shown in Table 2). For the condition-focus information structure used in the current study,
partial information included the base rate of a condition within a given population (C+ out of N),
along with the subset who will have the condition and test positive (C+T+), and the subset who
will not have the condition but also test positive (C-T+). In this format, the two complementary
subsets of those who test negative (when the condition is present or absent) were not provided.
In the test-focus information structure, the base rate of testing positive within a random sample
was given (T+ out of N). Additional subset information was provided about who will test
positive and have the condition (C+T+), as well as the subset who will test negative but also
have the condition (C+T-). The two complementary subsets of those who do not have the
condition (and test positive or negative) were not provided.
When full information was given in the problem, all four subsets of those who have or do
not have the condition and test positive or negative were clearly indicated within the appropriate
reference class. An example of the congruent and incongruent problem that includes full subset
information is included in Table 4.
The dependent variable was the number correct on the frequency response format for the
eight Bayesian reasoning problems (range: 0-8 correct responses on both numerator and
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denominator response components). Participants also provided the PPV as a percentage value
using a slider scale ranging from 0-100%. To examine the relationship between numeracy and
response accuracy, numerical abilities were measured using the 8-item Abbreviated Numeracy
Scale (ANS; Weller et al., 2012). The scale results in normally distributed scores and has
demonstrated sufficient reliability and validity (Cronbach’s α = .71; Weller et al., 2013).
Table 4. Example Presentations with Full Subset Information for the Mammography Problem
Incongruent Condition-Focus Problem – Full Subset Information
To determine whether a woman is at risk of breast cancer, doctors conduct mammogram
screenings. Sometimes women test positive even when they should test negative or test negative
when they should test positive. Here is some information for a random sample of 10,000
women who had a mammogram:
In this sample of 10,000 women, 100 have breast cancer.
Of the 100 women who have breast cancer:
80 received a positive result on their mammogram.
20 received a negative result on their mammogram.
Of the 9,900 women who do not have breast cancer:
990 received a positive result on their mammogram.
8910 received a negative result on their mammogram.
Imagine another random sample of 10,000 women who had a mammogram.
Congruent Test-Focus Problem – Full Subset Information
To determine whether a woman is at risk of breast cancer, doctors conduct mammogram
screenings. Sometimes women test positive even when they should test negative or test negative
when they should test positive. Here is some information for a random sample of 10,000
women who had a mammogram:
In this sample of 10,000 women, 1,070 received a positive result on their mammogram.
Of the 1,070 women who received a positive result on their mammogram:
80 have breast cancer.
990 do not have breast cancer.
Of the 8,930 women who received a negative result on their mammogram:
20 have breast cancer.
8,910 do not have breast cancer.
Imagine another random sample of 10,000 women who had a mammogram.
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Procedure. The experiment was hosted on Qualtrics.com™. All data were collected
during one-hour supervised sessions in a university computer lab equipped with 11 desktop
computers, allowing for multiple participants in each session. General instructions were read to
each group of participants, with additional instructions provided on each computer to guide
participants as they independently completed the experiment. Participants first completed the
Abbreviated Numeracy Scale. After numeracy items were completed, an experimenter provided
participants with a pencil and a blank paper form numbered 1 through 8, and entered the
reference code from the form into the computer (for tracking purposes). Participants then
advanced to another instructions page that indicated the paper form should be used for any notes
participants felt they needed to complete in the next section.
Each participant completed the eight problems as randomly ordered in Qualtrics.com™
(algorithm from Matsumoto & Nishimura, 1998). Each problem was presented by itself with the
frequency response format question presented first. Then they moved forward to a second screen
to answer the PPV question using the percentage response format. After completing the eight
problems, participants were instructed to see the experimenter for their course credit. At that
time, they were given an information sheet that provided a summary about Bayesian reasoning
and references to selected articles.
Results
Analysis for Experiment 1 was completed in three parts. First, I evaluated the
relationship between numeracy and accuracy on Bayesian reasoning tasks. Then, I analyzed the
extent to which accuracy was affected by congruence and amount of information while
controlling for differences in numerical skills. Then, response patterns were evaluated to
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determine the types of errors participants routinely made across the eight Bayesian reasoning
problems.
Numeracy. Numeracy was measured using the 8-item Abbreviated Numeracy Scale
(Weller et al., 2010). As anticipated, there was a strong positive relationship between numeracy
and the accuracy of responses to the frequency response format of solutions provided in the
Bayesian reasoning problems, r(234) = .44, p < .001. Consistent with previous findings (e.g.,
Garcia-Retamero & Galesic, 2010; Peters et al., 2006; Talboy & Schneider, 2017), stronger
numerical skills generally corresponded to higher accuracy rates on the Bayesian reasoning
tasks.
Congruence and amount of information. A 2 x 2 Congruence (congruent, incongruent)
x Information (partial subsets, full subsets) analysis of covariance was used to evaluate the
effects of the two primary between-subjects variables on accuracy while controlling for
differences in numeracy. An initial check of covariance assumptions was completed to ensure
that numeracy was not related to the independent variables of Congruence, F <1, or Information,
F <1.
As expected, those who read congruent problem-question pairings (Madj = 3.59) were
more accurate than those who read incongruent problem-question pairings (Madj = 2.59) even
after controlling for differences in numerical skill, F(1, 232) = 7.37, p = .007, 𝜂𝑝2 = .04.
Although this was a much smaller effect than predicted based on previous findings, this provides
at least weak support for the congruence hypothesis, which argues that the starting point
provided by the problem presentation influences the reasoner’s determination of the solution.
However, there was no discernable difference in accuracy between those who read
problems presented with partial information (Madj = 3.02) compared to full information (Madj =
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3.16), F < 1. Additionally, Figure 1 demonstrates that the interaction of congruence and amount
of information was not significant, F(1, 232) = 1.50, p = .22. Against expectations, I did not find
support for the mental models hypothesis or the discrimination hypothesis. Providing full
information was expected either to increase accuracy by helping reasoners extrapolate a more
complete mental model of the problem or to decrease accuracy by forcing reasoners to
discriminate among additional problem values. Within the congruent and incongruent pairings,
though, accuracy did not appear to significantly change as a function of whether partial versus
full information was provided.

Correct Frequency Responses out of 8

8

Partial Information
Full Information

7
6

5
4
3
2
1
0
Congruent

Incongruent

Problem-Question Pairings

Figure 1. Combined effects of congruence and amount of information on
accuracy.
Response patterns. I also analyzed denominator response patterns for each participant
across the eight Bayesian reasoning problems to determine if any particular problem-relevant but
incorrect value was routinely indicated (e.g., T+, C+, N). Consistent with the congruence
hypothesis, previous research has shown that reasoners have a value selection bias in which they
typically utilize the reference values provided in the problem presentation as part of their
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response, even when calculations are required (Talboy & Schneider, 2017, 2018a). Therefore,
the majority of responses were expected to conform to the T+ reference class in the congruent
pairings and the C+ reference class in the incongruent pairings, with a small portion of reasoners
using other reference values provided in the problem such as N (i.e., the total sample).
If participants provided four or more responses that conformed to the same value, this
was coded as their predominant response strategy for the denominator of the frequency response
format. Participants who did not consistently provide the same type of response across at least
four problems, but generally selected values from the problem text for the same answer
component were coded as “Other Selected.” Those who did not consistently provide the same
type of responses and did not appear to be routinely selecting values from the problem were
coded as “Other.”
Based on the congruence hypothesis, the percentage of participants who consistently
identify the correct response (i.e., at least four out of eight responses) was expected to be higher
on congruent problem-question pairings than incongruent pairings when either partial or full
subset information is provided (e.g., Talboy & Schneider, 2018a). However, as shown in Figure
2, the proportion of those who consistently identified the correct denominator value did not differ
between congruent and incongruent problem-question pairings.1 In each group, approximately
half of the participants were able to determine the correct value for the PPV denominator on at
least four of the eight problems. This finding will be evaluated in more depth in the next section.

1

Although the proportion of participants who consistently identified the correct denominator appeared to be similar,
the metric used for strategy evaluation did not take differences in rates of identification into account. Of those who
consistently identified the correct denominator (at least 4 out of 8), the average correct was higher on both response
components for congruent pairings (M = 6.91, SD = 1.12 for denominators and M = 6.90, SD = 1.46 for numerators)
than incongruent pairings (M = 6.15, SD = 1.29 for denominators and M = 5.65, SD = 2.60 for numerators).
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Figure 2. Proportion of participants who consistently used the correct
denominator strategy (left) or the incorrect denominator strategy (right) on the
frequency response format. C± denotes the total number of people who have or
do not have the condition. T± denotes the total number of people who test
positive or negative. Total N denotes the total in the superordinate set (i.e.,
sample size).
In addition to correct responses, I was particularly interested in determining which values
were provided when responses conformed to incorrect values. I expected to find a substantial
portion of participants consistently using the focal reference class (either T+ or C+ depending on
congruence) as their denominator on the frequency response format (e.g., Talboy & Schneider,
2018a). However, a different pattern of response errors was observed (right, Figure 2).
The predominant incorrect strategy was consistent with the overall sample size (N) rather
than the conflicting reference class. Few, if any, participants in the congruent or incongruent
pairings consistently utilized the C+ reference class or any other provided values. Only a
handful of reasoners provided responses that were not present in the problem. This pattern,
which is virtually identical for both the full and partial information conditions, provides support
for the value selection hypothesis in that reasoners were utilizing a prominent value from the
problem for their denominator response. However, the finding is inconsistent with previous
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research that shows reasoners are typically drawn to the focal reference class more so than any
other problem value.
Discussion
In Experiment 1, I found evidence in favor of the three primary hypotheses of numeracy,
congruence, and value selection bias. With regard to numeracy, there was a strong positive
relationship with accuracy on the Bayesian reasoning tasks. As predicted by the general
numeracy hypothesis, those with higher numerical skill were more accurate than those with
lower numerical abilities.
I expected a relatively large effect of congruence in which reasoners would be more
accurate when starting from a congruent problem presentation than from one that focused on the
incongruent reference classes. Although accuracy was generally higher for those who read
congruent pairings than those who read incongruent pairings, this effect was much smaller in the
current experiment compared to previous studies (e.g., Talboy & Schneider, 2018a, 2018b).
Additionally, the inclusion of partial versus full subset information did not appear to affect
accuracy for either the congruent or incongruent pairings.
The substantially reduced effect of congruence could be the result of what I thought were
minor changes to the problem presentation. Compared to previous problem formulations, the
problem form used in the current studies asked reasoners to imagine another sample of the same
size prior to reading the PPV question. Introducing this statement could have inadvertently
suggested to participants that the superordinate value indicating the size of that sample (N)
should be viewed as a focal reference point, making this value much more salient than
anticipated. Additionally, the PPV question was simplified to reduce redundancy of indicators
pointing to the correct reference class, which could have downplayed how important the T+
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value was for solution. These changes may have eliminated any benefit that would have
occurred when full subset information was provided compared to when only partial subset
information was available.
When I evaluated response errors to determine what might be drawing attention away
from the correct reference class, hardly any reasoners in either the congruent or incongruent
conditions showed evidence of incorrect computations, as the vast majority utilized values that
were presented within the problem. Consistent with the value selection prediction, the majority
of responses for the denominator conformed to a value presented in the problem. However,
reasoners were not selecting the focal reference class as predicted, but instead were
predominantly selecting the superordinate value (N). This indicates that reasoners were drawn
toward using the overall sample size as their reference value rather than the expected focal
reference class. I suspect that the apparent change in focus from the focal reference class to the
overall sample size altered the observed response strategies compared to those documented in
previous studies (e.g., Talboy & Schneider, 2017, 2018a). Nevertheless, the surprise finding
provides confirmation of the importance of salient reference points as a primary determinant of
answers to Bayesian reasoning problems.
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Experiment 2 – Selection versus Calculation
Although providing problem-question pairings with partial or full subset information
focused on a representational issue regarding identification and application of values from the
problem to the solution, it did little to elucidate the potential role of computation as an obstacle
to Bayesian reasoning. For both congruent and incongruent problem-question pairings, the first
value needed for the pair-of-integers frequency response format (i.e., the numerator) could be
selected directly from the problem presentation. However, the second value (i.e., the
denominator) had to be computed in the incongruent pairing but could be directly selected from
the problem in the congruent pairing.
Study 2 was designed to address this inherent confound, and further assess the extent to
which the reference dependence hypothesis holds when calculations are required. To do this, full
subset information was provided within both congruent and incongruent problem presentations,
but without reference class totals in either case. By removing these totals, participants could no
longer directly select and apply these values as their responses in either congruent or incongruent
pairings. This ensured that both types of pairings required the simple computation of adding two
subsets, and neither had the potential for interference from an inappropriate reference class total.
Incongruent Pairings
Regardless of whether partial or full subset information was provided within incongruent
pairings, reasoners had to identify and calculate the denominator of the frequency response
format to determine the correct solution. (This is also necessary in standard forms of Bayesian
reasoning problems.) This value (T+) was partitioned into two pieces of information as subsets
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of the alternate reference classes (C+T+ and C-T+). Therefore, reasoners had to first identify the
two subset values correctly to then compute the total of the relevant test reference class.
Although this is similar to what is required in the standard form of Bayesian reasoning problems,
it is not clear in the standard form whether the difficulty associated with this step of the
reasoning process is primarily related to recognizing which values are needed to sum to T+ or
overcoming the pull of the incongruent reference class.
Although results from Experiment 1 suggest that reasoners were drawn to the
superordinate set rather than the alternate C+ reference class total, many previous studies
indicate that reasoners routinely use the competing C+ reference class value as their preferred
denominator (e.g., Cosmides & Tooby, 1996; Talboy & Schneider, 2018a, 2018b). Given the
literature (coupled with the fact that the dissertation studies were run contemporaneously), I
predicted that when the competing C+ total is omitted from the problem presentation, two
different response patterns could emerge, which could help disentangle issues associated with
computational requirements from issues more closely tied to reference dependence.
Eliminating the presence of the alternate C+ reference class totals may increase accuracy
because I am removing a value that is hypothesized to interfere with reasoning about the correct
nested set (e.g., Reyna, 2004; Reyna & Brainerd, 2008). This could potentially reduce the
tendency to adopt the inappropriate total and thereby help reasoners recognize the need to engage
in the computational process of calculating values to reach the solution. Though if, as in
Experiment 1, reasoners are drawn to the superordinate set, the hypothesized increase in
accuracy may not be as strong as originally hypothesized.
Conversely, removal of the alternate C+ reference class totals may have little effect on
accuracy or may result in even lower accuracy rates than in standard problem forms. This would
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be expected if reasoners have a strong bias toward selecting values directly from the problem
text, rather than computing responses. In particular, the superordinate set is the only remaining
higher order value in the problem text that can be used as an organizational cue. This value
appears to draw reasoners away from the alternative C+ reference class, as demonstrated in
Experiment 1. As a result, removing other competing values may shift reasoners to reliance on
the overall sample value or, if removal of the reference class creates additional uncertainty about
how to proceed, it may push even more reasoners toward using the overall sample as their
preferred denominator compared to the proportion observed in Experiment 1. Therefore, if value
selection bias is supported, there should be a sizable portion of reasoners who utilize the
superordinate set as a frequency response component.
This led to the competing hypotheses for incongruent pairings in Experiment 2:
H5a) Interference reduction hypothesis: For incongruent pairings, removing
the competing reference class totals from the problem text may result in
higher problem solving accuracy than when reference class totals are
provided. If focusing on the competing reference class total is interfering
with the problem solving process, removing the competing value should
reduce interference, thus increasing accuracy.
H5b) Value selection hypothesis: To the extent that the overriding response
tendency is to select values from the problem rather than computing values
for solution, any effects of interference reduction may be relatively small
with response errors conforming to values presented in the problem,
especially the value representing the superordinate set or overall sample.
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Congruent Pairings
Unlike incongruent problem-question pairings, previous congruent pairings did not
require calculations for the denominator of the frequency response because the relevant reference
class totals were provided. In previous studies, this precluded isolation of the most important
reason for accuracy increases. Did accuracy improve because the problem-question pairing was
congruent or because no calculations were required? To address this confound, Experiment 2
compared performance on test-focus problems that included or omitted reference class totals.
When reference class totals are omitted, reasoners need to complete the computational step of
adding subsets, which is equivalent to what is typically required in the incongruent pairings.
By adding this computation step, I am able to evaluate the extent to which congruence
affects accuracy when computational difficulty is comparable for both congruent and
incongruent problem-question pairings. Although I still predict that congruence will result in
higher accuracy than incongruence even when calculations are required, I do expect a decrease in
accuracy on the congruent pairings when there is an added step involving computation.
This decrease in accuracy is predicted to be the result of two different mechanisms. First,
even for those who attempt the computation, accuracy may decrease because the arithmetic step
may be completed incorrectly, either resulting in “quasi-Bayesian responses” (i.e., responses that
use the correct component values but are not combined correctly; Macchi, 2000) or incorrect
values. With the first, there should be an increase in responses that is close to correct but
computationally inaccurate. With the second, accuracy could decrease due to reasoners’ bias in
favor of selecting values over computing values (Talboy & Schneider, 2018a). Therefore, there
should be an increase in other values from the problem being utilized as the denominator.
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H6) Selection and computation hypothesis: Removal of reference class totals
in congruent pairings is expected to result in lower problem solving accuracy
both because of (a) the required computation step adds complexity that is not
present when the needed reference class totals are provided in the problem
and (b) the bias to select values provided in the problem.
Method
Participants. For Experiment 2, there were 118 psychology undergraduates who were
randomly assigned to one of two between-subjects conditions that provided either congruent or
incongruent problems without reference class totals. Their performance was compared to data
from the two conditions in Experiment 1 that presented full subset information with reference
class totals. In all, data from 236 participants were analyzed in Experiment 2. (All conditions
were randomly assigned at the same time.)
Design. This experiment employed a 2 x 2 Congruence (congruent, incongruent) x
Reference Class Totals (included, omitted) between-subjects design. The primary dependent
variable was accuracy on the PPV question in the frequency response format (___ out of ___
people). All four problem-question variations utilized in this experiment included full subset
information in either an incongruent condition-focus or a congruent test-focus presentation.
To isolate performance issues, information about the reference class totals was either
provided (in the congruent and incongruent full information conditions from Experiment 1) or
omitted (newly introduced conditions of Experiment 2). When reference class totals were
provided, those who read congruent pairings did not need to complete any calculations to
determine the correct denominator as the value could be selected directly from the problem.
However, incongruent pairings required an additional computation step to determine the

39
denominator of the frequency response. An example of how these problems appeared when
reference class totals were included is shown in Table 4 from Experiment 1.
When the reference class totals were omitted, both the congruent and incongruent
pairings required the same level of computation to determine the correct solution. An example
of how the problems appeared when reference class totals were omitted is shown in Table 5.
As before, the ANS was used to measure numeracy. The procedure was identical to
Experiment 1.

40
Table 5. Example Presentations without Reference Class Totals for the Mammography Problem
Incongruent Condition-Focus Problem without Reference Class Totals
To determine whether a woman is at risk of breast cancer, doctors conduct mammogram
screenings. Sometimes women test positive even when they should test negative or test negative
when they should test positive. Here is some information for a random sample of 10,000
women who had a mammogram:
In this sample of 10,000 women:
Of those who have breast cancer:
80 received a positive result on their mammogram.
20 received a negative result on their mammogram.
Of those who do not have breast cancer:
990 received a positive result on their mammogram.
8910 received a negative result on their mammogram.
Imagine another random sample of 10,000 women who had a mammogram.
Congruent Test-Focus Problem without Reference Class Totals
To determine whether a woman is at risk of breast cancer, doctors conduct mammogram
screenings. Sometimes women test positive even when they should test negative or test negative
when they should test positive. Here is some information for a random sample of 10,000
women who had a mammogram:
In this sample of 10,000 women:
Of those who received a positive result on their mammogram:
80 have breast cancer.
990 do not have breast cancer.
Of those who received a negative result on their mammogram:
20 have breast cancer.
8910 do not have breast cancer.
Imagine another random sample of 10,000 women who had a mammogram.

Results
Numeracy. Numeracy was again assessed in relation to accuracy on the frequency
response format using the Abbreviated Numeracy Scale. As found in Experiment 1, results
indicated a strong positive relationship between numerical abilities and accuracy on Bayesian
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reasoning tasks, r(234) = .47, p < .001. Again, I confirmed that stronger numerical skills are
related to higher levels of accuracy on Bayesian reasoning tasks.
Congruence and reference class totals. A 2 x 2 Congruence (congruent, incongruent) x
Reference Class Totals (included, omitted) analysis of covariance was used to assess the effects
of the two primary between-subjects variables on accuracy while controlling for numeracy. As
with the first experiment, an initial check of covariance assumptions was completed and
indicated that numeracy was not significantly different within the independent variables of
congruence, F < 1, and reference class totals, F < 1.
Against expectations, the main effect of congruence on accuracy was not significant
when controlling for numeracy, F < 1. Accuracy was comparable, and relatively low, regardless
of whether participants viewed congruent problem-question pairings (Madj = 3.54) or incongruent
problem-question pairings (Madj = 3.53). Counter to previous findings, there was no evidence to
suggest that congruence between the problems and questions increased accuracy compared to
when incongruent pairings were provided. Additionally, there was no main effect of reference
class totals, mean accuracy was similar when reference class totals were provided (Madj = 3.18)
or omitted (Madj = 3.89), F(1, 231) = 3.6, p = .06, 𝜂𝑝2 = .02. This is not entirely surprising as
removal of the reference class totals from the congruent pairings was expected to decrease
accuracy, whereas removal of reference class totals from the incongruent pairings was expected
to increase accuracy.
Pivotal to our hypotheses, however, was the Congruence x Reference class Total
interaction effect. As shown in Figure 3, this effect was not significant, F(1, 231) = 1.79, p =
.18. Nevertheless, given specific predictions related to the simple effects of reference class totals
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inside of congruent and incongruent problem questions pairings, I tested these to see if there was
any evidence of predicted effects.

Correct Frequency Responses out of 8
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Figure 3. Results for the combined effects of congruence and reference class
totals while controlling for numeracy on adjusted means of accuracy. Error bars
represent ±1 SE.
For the congruent pairings, I predicted that accuracy would be lower when reference class
totals were omitted from versus included due to the added requirement to compute the
denominator value. However, there was no evidence that the presence or absence of the correct
reference class total significantly affected accuracy in the congruent pairings, F < 1. Generally
speaking, it appears that reasoners were not thrown off by the need to compute as roughly the
same proportion determined the correct denominator regardless of whether the value was
provided directly or had to be calculated from the subset information. Nevertheless, as noted in
Experiment 1, accuracy rates were unexpectedly low in both conditions. Although accuracy was
much lower than that documented in previous research (Talboy & Schneider, 2018a, 2018b), the
lack of change in accuracy is surprising and goes against our hypothesis based on the general
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presumption that, all else equal, reasoners perform worse on problems that require calculation
(e.g., McDowell & Jacobs, 2017).
Within the incongruent pairings, I expected that removing the competing reference class
totals from the problem might increase accuracy compared to when these values were included.
However, the extent to which interference was reduced was also predicted to be relatively small,
and possibly compromised by added confusion about how to proceed in answering the problem
without a value corresponding to the implied reference class.
The simple effect of reference class totals on accuracy in the incongruent problems
supports the interference hypothesis, albeit weakly, F(1, 231) = 5.21, p = .02, 𝜂𝑝2 = .02. This
relatively small effect suggests that when reference class totals from the incorrect reference class
are present, they may cause at least some interference misleading reasoners about which values
are relevant to problem solution. Evaluation of response patterns are considered next to
elucidate which values participants were most likely to consistently provide when answering the
PPV question, with specific attention to the value selection hypothesis.
Denominator response strategies. I again assessed patterns of denominator responses
to determine if errors could be attributed to selection of values given in the problem (and, if so,
which ones) or incorrect computations. As in Experiment 1, response patterns for each
participant were evaluated to determine if responses errors consistently conformed to identifiable
response patterns (on at least four of the eight problems).
In both the congruent and incongruent pairings, regardless of whether the reference class
totals were provided, a large majority of incorrect responses aligned with the superordinate set
(N) as shown in Figure 4. As predicted by value selection bias hypothesis, reasoners were
latching on to the only remaining reference value provided, which was the superordinate value.
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As shown in the two conditions discussed in Experiment 1 when reference class totals were
provided, very few reasoners consistently used the C+ reference class, even when it was
presumably salient in the incongruent condition. This same pattern was also observed when no
reference class values were provided. Reasoners from the two new conditions in this experiment
also appear to be selecting the overall sample size when they are not sure or cannot (or will not)
complete the computations required to determine the correct response.
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Congruent without RC Totals
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Figure 4. Proportion of participants who consistently used an incorrect
denominator strategy on the frequency response format. C± denotes the total
number of people who have or do not have the condition. Total N denotes the
total in the superordinate set (i.e., sample size).
Numeracy and calculations. In this study, there was an additional numeracy prediction
that the performance advantage for those high in numeracy would be particularly strong for
problems that required calculation to determine the correct response compared to problems
without computations. The relationship between numeracy and accuracy was fairly strong on
congruent problems that required adding two values together to determine the correct
denominator, r(57) = .45, p < .001, as well as on those that did not require calculation, r(57) =
.32, p = .01. Although in the predicted direction, the difference between these two correlation
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coefficients was not significant, z = 0.81, p = .21. Thus, there is insufficient evidence to
conclude that numeracy was more or less important when calculations were required to arrive at
the correct solution compared to when the value could be selected directly from the problem, and
that at least some level of numerical proficiency was required to determine the correct response
in either case.
Discussion
In Experiment 2, I was particularly interested in the role of calculation in solving
Bayesian reasoning tasks. I found additional support for the general relationship between
numeracy and accuracy, as well as the value selection bias. However, the primary hypothesis of
congruence was not supported in this study. Reasoners who read congruent problem-question
pairings performed about the same on these tasks as those who read incongruent pairings.
Although stronger numeracy predicted higher accuracy on Bayesian reasoning tasks, there was
insufficient evidence to suggest numeracy was more or less important when calculations were
required on the congruent pairings. Further, incorrect responses from both congruent and
incongruent pairings virtually always corresponded to values provided in the problem rather than
computation errors.
As in Experiment 1, the two newly introduced conditions of Experiment 2 also showed
that the majority of reasoners who did not determine the correct response in either the congruent
or incongruent pairings consistently utilized the superordinate set (N) rather than any other value
provided in the problem presentation. In line with the value selection bias, it appears that
removing reference class totals from the incongruent problems pushed reasoners to look for other
salient reference values (such as N) to use as part of their solution rather than completing
calculations.
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Experiment 3 – Reference Dependence
Experiment 3 provides a new assessment of the role of reference dependence in
Bayesian reasoning by altering the nesting of subset information. This was done by evaluating
performance on problems that organized the four subsets into two related reference classes (C+
and C- or T+ and T-) or a single superordinate set (N), or provided no explicit organizing
information (i.e., an unlabeled nesting). By directly manipulating the organization of the subsets
into different types of nested structures, I can further assess the extent to which the presence or
type of key reference values affects reasoners’ abilities to determine the PPV in Bayesian
reasoning tasks.
Reference Dependence
The majority of Bayesian reasoning tasks explicitly organize the subsets of interest into
reference classes, through both verbal and visual nesting. Talboy and Schneider (2018a, 2018b)
found that the majority of participants utilized the focal reference class as part of their solution
for PPV questions, particularly on the denominator of the frequency response format. When the
problem-question pairings were congruent, this resulted in the correct response as the focal
reference class from the problem (T+) was required for solution. However, when the problemquestion pairings were incongruent, reasoners typically used the alternate C+ reference class as
their denominator of the frequency response (Cosmides & Tooby, 1996; Galesic et al., 2009;
Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, & Kleinbölting, 1991; Talboy & Schneider,
2017, 2018a; Wolfe, Fisher, & Reyna, 2013).
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Reference dependence suggests that reasoners will rely on the context in which the
subsets are organized to determine the solution to Bayesian reasoning problems. In the problem
formulations from Experiments 1 and 2, there were two ways reasoners were encouraged to use
the problem structure to determine the solution to PPV questions. First, a visual structuring
(indentation) demonstrated how the subsets were nested within each of the indicated reference
classes. Second, there was a verbal organization describing which subsets belong to which
reference classes, along with information that all of the values were drawn from the
superordinate set.
Results from Experiment 2 suggested that in the absence of the value for the nesting
reference class, decision makers, especially in incongruent problems, rely on another potential
reference class value: the superordinate set size (N). Results from both Experiments 1 and 2
suggest I inadvertently reinforced the superordinate set as another prominent reference point by
adding an additional statement about this value into the problems. When reasoners did not
determine the correct denominator values in those two studies, the majority of them used the
superordinate value (N) for their denominator instead of the focal reference classes from the
problem. In Experiment 3, I explicitly test the influence of drawing attention to the potential
relevance of this value by introducing a problem formulation in which the visual organization
created nesting under the superordinate set rather than the condition or test reference classes. An
example of superordinate set nesting is provided in Table 6. By visually nesting all four possible
subsets into the superordinate set, the superordinate becomes the explicit reference class within
which the subsets are organized or nested.
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Table 6. Example Presentations with Superordinate Set Organization for the Mammography
Problem
Incongruent Condition-Focus Problem with Superordinate Set Organization
To determine whether a woman is at risk of breast cancer, doctors conduct mammogram
screenings. Sometimes women test positive even when they should test negative or test negative
when they should test positive. Here is some information for a random sample of 10,000
women who had a mammogram:
In this sample of 10,000 women:
80 have breast cancer AND received a positive result on their mammogram.
20 have breast cancer AND received a negative result on their mammogram.
990 do not have breast cancer AND received a positive result on their mammogram.
8910 do not have breast cancer AND received a negative result on their mammogram.
Imagine another random sample of 10,000 women who had a mammogram.
Congruent Test-Focus Problem with Superordinate Set Organization
To determine whether a woman is at risk of breast cancer, doctors conduct mammogram
screenings. Sometimes women test positive even when they should test negative or test negative
when they should test positive. Here is some information for a random sample of 10,000
women who had a mammogram:
In this sample of 10,000 women:
80 received a positive result on their mammogram AND have breast cancer.
990 received a positive result on their mammogram AND do not have breast cancer.
20 received a negative result on their mammogram AND have breast cancer.
8910 received a negative result on their mammogram AND do not have breast cancer.
Imagine another random sample of 10,000 women who had a mammogram.

If reference dependence plays a primary role in how people go about solving these
problems, this superordinate reference point should function similarly to the condition-focus
reference class in the standard incongruent problem-question pairing from previous research
(e.g., Talboy & Schneider, 2018a, 2018b). Rather than determining the correct reference class
total of all those who test positive (T+), which is the appropriate denominator for the PPV
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question, reasoners were expected to utilize the superordinate set as the reference class for their
solution because it is the focal reference value presented in the problem. Because this appeared
to be such a focal reference point in the previous two studies, I expect that the proportion who
use this value will be relatively large in all three problem formulations for Experiment 3, with its
use being highest when the subsets are organized into the superordinate value.
In this superordinate nesting, the four subsets were still organized to be congruent or
incongruent with the PPV question, though the organization was more implicit than in previous
manipulations. In this case, congruence refers only to the ordering of the subsets and the
ordering of the features within each subset statement. For the congruent test-focus problem, the
test result was always indicated prior to the condition. For the incongruent condition-focus
problem, the condition was always indicated prior to the test result. This type of organization
provided an internal, embedded structure that reasoners could still utilize as a reference point for
their deliberations, although the manipulation was much more subtle.
The implicit congruence of the problem with the PPV question becomes more important
when all explicit reference points are eliminated from the problem presentation, as they were in
the second novel problem formulation created for this experiment. The second problem
formulation removed all explicit structural reference cues such as the reference classes or
superordinate set (except, in hindsight, for the statement about imagining another random sample
of the same number of people). In this problem formulation shown in Table 7, there were no
visual or verbal nesting components that explicitly indicated how the subsets were related to one
another. The implicit level of congruence or incongruence was retained, though, as the four
subsets were organized to focus on either the test result or the condition status first, with the
sentences belonging to each congruent or incongruent reference class occurring together.
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Although the superordinate set and reference classes could be computed based on the
values provided if the reasoners determined they were necessary for solution, there were no other
explicit reference values within the problem presentation that could be used as a guide. (Note.
The superordinate value was not present in this version of the statement asking participants to
imagine a new random sample, so it could not be used as a guide as it might have been in other
conditions.) The implicit verbal ordering of the reference classes within individual descriptions
of each subset may not be as helpful as providing an explicit anchor, but it might still be used as
an organizational cue for solution.
Table 7. Example Presentations with No Explicit Organization for the Mammography Problem
Incongruent Condition-Focus Problem with No Explicit Organization
To determine whether a woman is at risk of breast cancer, doctors conduct mammogram
screenings. Sometimes women test positive even when they should test negative or test negative
when they should test positive. Here is some information for a random sample of women who
had a mammogram:
80 have breast cancer and received a positive result on their mammogram.
20 have breast cancer and received a negative result on their mammogram.
990 do not have breast cancer and received a positive result on their mammogram.
8910 do not have breast cancer and received a negative result on their mammogram.
Imagine another random sample of the same number of women who had a mammogram.
Congruent Test-Focus Problem with No Explicit Organization
To determine whether a woman is at risk of breast cancer, doctors conduct mammogram
screenings. Sometimes women test positive even when they should test negative or test negative
when they should test positive. Here is some information for a random sample of women who
had a mammogram:
80 received a positive result on their mammogram and have breast cancer.
990 received a positive result on their mammogram and do not have breast cancer.
20 received a negative result on their mammogram and have breast cancer.
8910 received a negative result on their mammogram and do not have breast cancer.
Imagine another random sample of the same number of women who had a mammogram.
By removing the structural organization, our intention was to eliminate the reference
class structure that intuitively led reasoners to rely on these values for solution. (For more on the
defining role of structural organization in problem solving, see Kotovsky & Simon, 1990; Simon,
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1973.) Therefore, accuracy was expected to decrease as the explicit structure on which
uninitiated reasoners depend was removed, particularly the provision of a structural reference
point. Even with this anticipated decrease in accuracy, though, the congruent pairings were still
expected to result in, at least, slightly higher accuracy than incongruent pairings because of the
congruent statements could be more readily matched to the order of what was being asked for in
the problem.
H7) Reference dependence hypothesis: Accuracy will decrease when subsets
are organized using the superordinate set compared to explicit congruent
reference classes. Accuracy will decrease further when no explicit reference
point is provided. This decrease in problem solving accuracy is expected due
to the reduction in explicit contextual organization of the nested sets via
provided useful/helpful reference classes.
Value Selection Bias
Consistent with what I found in Experiments 1 and 2, incorrect responses on the
denominators were expected to coincide with key reference values provided in the problem
presentations. The value selection bias hypothesis predicts that participants are more likely to
offer given values rather than computing values to arrive at their answer. Taken together with
predictions of the reference dependence hypothesis, I expected that reasoners would have a
tendency to utilize whichever structural reference point was provided (either reference class or
superordinate set value) as the anchor for answering the question of interest.
With regard to use of the superordinate set, results from Experiment 1 and 2 demonstrate
that the majority of reasoners used this value for their denominator in conditions where this value
was readily available. In problem structures that organized subsets into the reference classes or
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the superordinate value, I anticipated based on the previous results that a large proportion of
reasoners would select N as their denominator.
When these structural reference points were removed, as they were in the third problem
formulation, I expected reasoners’ responses to be more erratic, with selection errors being more
common than errors involving any kind of computation. Nevertheless, I predicted some tendency
to rely on the implicit reference structure that was used to organize the subset statements for
determining their solution.
Method
Participants. For Experiment 3, there were 235 psychology undergraduates who were
randomly assigned to one of four novel between-subjects conditions. Their performance was
compared to data from the two newly-introduced conditions in Experiment 2 that provided
reference class organization with full subset information but no reference class totals. In total,
data from 353 participants were analyzed in Experiment 3.
Design. This experiment employed a 2 x 3 Congruence (congruent, incongruent) x
Organization (reference classes, superordinate set, none) between-subjects design. The
dependent variable was average accuracy on the frequency response format for the eight
Bayesian reasoning problems (range: 0-8 correct responses).
Each problem variation utilized in this experiment included full subset information with
no condition or test reference class totals in either an incongruent condition-focus or a congruent
test-focus presentation. In this way, all participants were required to complete computations to
determine the correct denominator values. Problems were either nested in reference classes or
the superordinate set, or were not give any explicit visual nesting. Numerical abilities were
measured using the ANS.
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The procedure was identical to Experiments 1 and 2.
Results
Numeracy. Numeracy was again assessed using the ANS to determine the relationship
between numeracy and accuracy on the frequency response format. Consistent with results of
Experiments 1 and 2, there was a strong positive relationship between numeracy and frequency
response accuracy, r(351) = .41, p < .001. This provides further evidence for the general
numeracy hypothesis suggesting that at least some level of numeric proficiency is required to
perform well on these types of tasks.
Congruence. A 2 x 3 Congruence x Organization (reference class, superordinate, none)
analysis of covariance was used to analyze the effects of congruence and problem organization
on accuracy while controlling for numeracy. An initial check of the ANCOVA assumptions
indicates that numeracy was not significantly different across the congruence conditions, F < 1,
or organization conditions, F(1, 343) = 2.69, p = .07.
As found in Experiment 2, there was no main effect of congruence on accuracy when
controlling for numeracy, F < 1. On average, those who read congruent problem-question
pairings (Madj = 3.87) performed similarly to those who read incongruent problem-question
pairings (M adj = 4.07), solving on average about half of the problems experienced. There was no
main effect of problem organization, F(2, 346) = 1.17, p = .31, but there was a Congruence x
Organization interaction, F(2, 346) = 7.55, p = .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .04, which is shown in Figure 5.
Simple effects analysis was completed to evaluate the effect of organization within each
level of congruence. For those who read congruent problem-question pairings, I expected that
accuracy would decrease as organizational structure was decreased. Within the congruent
pairings (left, Figure 5), accuracy was significantly different across the three problem
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organizations, but was not consistent with the predicted pattern, F(2, 346) = 6.92, p = .001, 𝜂𝑝2 =
.04. Accuracy was comparable between the presumably helpful reference class structure and the
presumably less helpful superordinate organization, p = .29. Furthermore, removing all explicit
organization actually increased accuracy compared to the reference class organization, p = .01,
and compared to problems organized into the superordinate set, p < .001.
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Figure 5. The interaction of congruence and problem organization on accuracy.
Error bars indicate ±1 SE.
In retrospect, this lends additional support to the interference hypothesis, which suggests
that reasoners were latching on to a value provided in the problem presentation that drew
attention away from the correct reference class value. In this case, the superordinate value,
which was provided several times in the reference class and superordinate organizations but not
provided in the problems with no organization, may have been causing an unintended
interference effect wherein participants were (erroneously) drawn to the superordinate value as
the denominator for the PPV estimate.
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For incongruent pairings, it was expected that accuracy would be low in all cases, as
there was no problem structure that was designed to draw attention to the correct reference class.
Within the incongruent pairings (right, Figure 5), accuracy did not differ when the problem was
organized into the reference class structure or superordinate set, or when all explicit organization
was removed, F(2, 346) = 1.71, p = .18. Accuracy did not change as the confusing problem
structure in the incongruent pairings was altered to introduce another misleading reference point
(i.e., the superordinate value) or when the overarching reference point was removed. This
suggests that reasoners were not helped, nor necessarily hindered further, by changes in the
explicit organization when starting from an (either explicit or implicit) organization that is
incongruent with the question of interest.
Response patterns. To further assess the role of organizational structure, I evaluated
denominator responses for each participant to determine who consistently conformed to
identifiable response patterns (on at least four of the eight problems). Response patterns were
coded using the same process from Experiments 1 and 2 to allow for comparison across studies.
Reasoners who did not consistently provide the correct denominator are shown in Figure 6.
As found in Experiments 1 and 2, the vast majority of incorrect responses conformed to
the total sample size (N) rather than any other value provided in the problem. Although this had
been found in the previous studies, the finding was particularly surprising in the no explicit
organization problems, as reasoners would have to calculate the total N value by adding together
all four subset values. This suggests that participants had little trouble performing the addition
calculation of a given value if they felt that it would provide the answer needed. Thus, the
calculation itself is not necessarily the difficulty associated with completing (frequency)
Bayesian reasoning tasks. Instead, it seems that reasoners are not sure which values are needed
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for solution. In this case, they had a guiding statement at the end that directed attention back
toward the overall sample size (in very generic terms), which may have been used as a cue that
this value was needed for solution. This is the only finding that goes against the value selection
bias, and instead suggests that reasoners look for organization cues to determine which values
are needed for solution. Value selection may only become the predominant tendency when
reasoners are confused about how to reach the solution.
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Figure 6. Proportion of participants who consistently used the correct
denominator strategy (left) or the incorrect denominator strategy (right) on the
frequency response format. C± denotes the total number of people who have or
do not have the condition. Total N denotes the total in the superordinate set (i.e.,
sample size).

Discussion
In Experiment 3, I found clear evidence suggesting the importance of the structural
organization of the problem. The congruence hypothesis was supported when all explicit
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organizational cues were eliminated from the problem presentation, but not on problems that
organized subsets into the newly-created superordinate set condition or the reference class
conditions (without totals) from Experiment 2. Unexpectedly, when the only reference point
value available was the superordinate set, accuracy on incongruent pairings was typically higher
than comparable congruent pairings.
When reasoners were not correctly calculating the denominator value, the majority of
them utilized the superordinate value (N) much more so than any other value across all problem
forms. Based on the response patterns, it appears that the superordinate value (N) was creating a
salient reference point in the problem organizations, even when the value was not explicitly
provided. Instead of demonstrating a value selection bias in this case, reasoners were calculating
the total N from the four subsets. Numerical skill was again a strong predictor of accuracy.
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General Discussion
The goal of these three experiments was to evaluate the representational and
computational aspects of Bayesian reasoning tasks as they relate to reference dependence. The
most consistent and surprising finding in all three experiments was that people were much more
likely to utilize the superordinate value as part of their solution rather than the anticipated
reference class values. This resulted in a weakened effect of congruence, with relatively low
accuracy even in congruent conditions, as well as a different pattern of response errors than what
was anticipated. There was consistent and strong evidence of a value selection bias in that
incorrect responses almost always conformed to values that were provided in the problem rather
than errors related to computation. The one notable exception occurred when no organizing
information was available in the problem, other than the instruction to consider a sample of the
same size as that in the problem. In that case, participants were most apt to sum all of the subsets
of the sample to yield the size of the original sample (N). In all three experiments, higher
numerical skills were generally associated with higher accuracy, whether calculations were
required or not.
Reference Dependence
The results of these three experiments indicate that the initial presentation of the problem
directly informed how reasoners responded to the positive predictive value (PPV) question.
However, the responses I observed were unexpected, and highlighted the importance of reference
dependence in ways that were not predicted.
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I proposed that many of the representational and computational difficulties associated
with Bayesian reasoning tasks were due to reference dependence, or the tendency to adopt a
given or implied reference point at the start of cognitive deliberations. In the Bayesian reasoning
problems used here, important reference points in the problem were specified through verbal and
visual indicators, and I predicted that reasoners would utilize these cues to determine which
values were key reference values needed for solution. Although some used these reference
values for solution, there was another aspect of the problem formulations used in the current
studies that may have unintentionally pulled attention to a different reference point, the
superordinate value (N).
Previous studies have reported similar accuracy rates whether the estimates provided in
the Bayesian reasoning problems referred to the initial sample (e.g., Sirota et al., 2014) or to a
new representative sample of the same size (e.g., Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995). A large-scale
meta-analysis evaluated problem forms that explicitly stated a superordinate value in the problem
description (but not necessarily that the problem values should be applied to a new sample of the
same size) and found that having this information available did not improve performance
(McDowell & Jacobs, 2017). Thus, I did not expect to observe an impact of describing the
solution needed in terms of a new sample.
However, in hindsight, I realize that accuracy on those problems was consistently low, as
all previous studies used the incongruent problem-question pairings. The lack of a discernible
difference from introducing a new sample could be the result of a floor effect. Moreover,
because the pattern of errors were not typically reported, I cannot differentiate whether accuracy
was generally low because reasoners were using the superordinate value when it was salient, or
because they were latching on to the incongruent reference class from the problem.
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In the current studies, the superordinate value was emphasized in the problem and the
question throughout all of the problem presentations except for the problem form in Experiment
3 that provided no explicit organizational structure. Even there, the reference to imagining a new
sample of the same size likely served as a potent cue to find that value. Thus, the majority of
incorrect denominator responses in both congruent and incongruent problem-question pairings
conformed to the superordinate value rather than any other predicted value. Even in the simplest
form of the congruent problem-question pairings tested in Experiment 1 (which was meant to be
a replication of Talboy and Schneider, 2018a), where the correct denominator value could be
directly selected from the problem, the focus on the superordinate value provided enough pull
that accuracy was only around 50% rather than at the expected 80% mark.
By drawing attention to the superordinate value in the question being asked of
participants, I apparently made this one of the, if not the most, salient reference point. The
dependence on this reference point rivaled the strength of the correct reference point that was
included in the congruent problems. In the incongruent problems, it was even stronger than the
incorrect reference class within which the subsets were nested. In all experiments, it was almost
the only other value suggested for the denominator other than the correct value. An additional
study is currently underway to confirm that the instruction to consider a new sample of the same
size can account for the superordinate value becoming a focal reference point, leading to these
differences in accuracy and changes in the denominator response strategies between the current
and past experiments. Regardless, the unexpected reliance on this reference point lends support
to the larger hypothesis that reference dependence plays a large role in performance on Bayesian
reasoning tasks.
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Congruent Problem Structuring
In addition to the verbal and visual cues indicating potential reference points, the overall
structure of the problem can either guide reasoners to the correct values needed for solution (in a
congruent pairing) or cause confusion about which values should be used in the answer (in an
incongruent pairing). The congruent format was expected to increase accuracy because the
reference values that were highlighted in the problem structure through verbal and visual cues
aligned with the question of interest (Talboy & Schneider, 2018a, 2018b). Alternatively, the
incongruent format was expected to cause confusion because the reference values were not
consistent with those needed to find the correct solution.
However, the effect of congruence was weak in these studies compared to previous
research (e.g., Talboy & Schneider, 2018a, 2018b). Further, the congruence effect was reversed
in Experiment 3 when the problems were organized into the superordinate set, resulting in higher
accuracy on the incongruent pairing rather than the congruent pairing. The weak effect of
congruence (and possibly the reversed effect) is likely the result of unintentionally focusing
attention on the superordinate (N) value rather than the reference classes. If so, this also
highlights the importance of the problem and question structuring, and in particular, signaling the
implied reference point of interest for obtaining the solution.
When all explicit organization is removed and reasoners are left with the four subsets
subtly organized in a congruent or incongruent manner, the congruent pairings resulted in higher
accuracy than incongruent pairings. In this case, the superordinate value was no longer directly
highlighted as a reference point at the beginning and end of the problem, though attention was
still drawn to the overall sample size in very generic terms without a numeric value assigned to
it. It appears that removing the numeric indicator of the superordinate value may have reduced
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interference and increased accuracy, but that even a non-numeric focus on this organizational cue
may still have limited accurate identification of the correct reference class. This is consistent
with the finding that the total sample size was by far the most common error in this condition
even though participants had to add all four given values to produce this answer.
Even though the effect of congruence in the above condition was relatively small, the
manipulation of congruence when explicit organization was removed was much subtler
compared to previous studies. Rather than being a means to explain the alignment between
verbal and visual indicators of the reference classes in the problem and those needed for solution,
congruence in Experiment 3 referred to the ordering of the problem statements to focus on the
test result or condition presence first. Structurally, the explicit reference points were eliminated
as all four subsets were presented in a single block rather than broken out into visually and
verbally defined reference classes. Therefore, it is not surprising to find this effect is much
smaller than in studies in which reference points were structurally signaled.
Amount of information. Reasoners create mental representations of the problem
structure based almost exclusively on the information that is provided (Johnson-Laird, 1994;
Kintsch & Greeno, 1985; Sirota, Juanchich, et al., 2014). In accordance with the mental models
approach, I hypothesized that giving reasoners full subset information would result in higher
accuracy than when only partial information is provided. However, I also introduced an
alternative discrimination hypothesis, that including additional subset information could result in
lower accuracy because reasoners would have greater difficulty discriminating among a larger
set of values.
Against expectations, though, inclusion of partial versus full information in the problem
presentation did not have any discernible effect on accuracy, regardless of congruence between
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the problem and question of interest. In each case, performance on the congruent pairing was
moderate, with performance on the incongruent pairings relatively low as has been found in any
number of previous studies (e.g., Gigerenzer, Gaissmaier, Kurz-Milcke, Schwartz, & Woloshin,
2007; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; Hoffrage, Krauss, Martignon, & Gigerenzer, 2015; Johnson
& Tubau, 2015; Reyna & Brainerd, 2008; Sirota, Kostovičová, & Vallée-Tourangeau, 2015).
The lack of a difference in accuracy with full information suggests that including the two
non-essential subsets did not help reasoners figure out how to find the solution. It also did not
hurt their ability. However, the unexpected focus on the superordinate value (N), which then
became a salient reference point, may have overshadowed any possible effect of being given full
subset information versus partial information. A future study could reassess whether the
inclusion of full subset information alters accuracy without the distraction of a second salient
reference point.
Removing interference from misleading reference points. Unlike the full versus
partial information manipulation, changing or removing focal reference values from the problem
had a differential effect on accuracy for reasoners who read incongruent or congruent pairings.
Within the incongruent pairings, focal reference points that organized information in a
way that did not draw attention to the correct solution were expected to cause an interference
effect that reasoners would need to overcome in order to accurately solve the problem. Evidence
for this was seen in the congruence effect observed in Experiment 1. In Experiment 2, when the
competing C+ reference class was the nesting structure but the values were removed, accuracy
increased, though only by a small amount. So, there seemed to be a slight release from
interference, but the error analysis suggested that this was countered by the tendency for
reasoners to be drawn to the N value. Further, in Experiment 3 when the explicit structure was
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eliminated, a large portion of reasoners were consistently calculating the total sample (N) instead
of the correct T+ reference value. This suggests that the incongruent problem presentation did
not clearly elucidate which reference value was needed for the PPV question, even after
competing values were eliminated from the problem description.
Additional evidence for the interference hypothesis was unexpectedly found with
structural changes to the congruent problem-question pairings. When all organizational cues and
totals were eliminated from the problem presentations in Experiment 3, those who read sentences
with a congruent ordering performed substantively better than when subsets were nested within
test reference classes or the superordinate set (N). The unstructured condition was the only
problem in which the total sample N value was not provided anywhere in the problem. This
finding suggests that the presence of the N value must have been interfering with the ability to
take advantage of the correct nested structure. This goes back to the general presumption that
the reference class values would be the most salient reference point in the problem presentation,
and that congruence would help reasoners organize the subset information into a structure that
leads directly to the solution. Instead, by focusing on the superordinate (N) value in the
question, I likely introduced an interference effect in the congruent pairings that was not
anticipated. This suggests the importance of ruling out additional salient reference points within
the problem as well as the question being asked.
Value Selection Bias
In addition to the primary findings regarding reference dependence and congruence, I
also investigated the general bias toward selecting values from the problem rather than
completing calculations when reasoners were unsure of how to determine the solution. In each
experiment, virtually all reasoners who did not determine the correct response utilized values
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directly from the problem to fill in each component of their solution. Hardly any reasoners made
responses that were consistent with calculation errors. This provided strong support for the value
selection bias (while also confirming the strong draw to the superordinate set value as the
denominator).
When reasoners are not familiar with the type of problem that has to be solved, they tend
to rely on surface features to guide their solution (Chi, Feltovich, et al., 1981; Chi, Glaser, et al.,
1981; Owen & Sweller, 1989; Swanson & Beebe-Frankenberger, 2004; Winner et al., 1980).
This tendency may reflect a lack of willingness to engage the mental resources needed to fully
flesh out the problem space (e.g., "the lazy controller," Kahneman, 2011), which results in
responses consistent with the identifiable problem values rather than calculation mistakes. This
bias may also reflect a general belief that relevant values should be readily available in the
problem description, and so calculations should not be needed (Talboy & Schneider, 2018a). I
consistently observed this value selection bias as the default response strategy when reasoners
did not determine the correct response in all three experiments. This highlights the need to
identify and develop methods for overcoming the tendency to select values in order to better
assess what steps are actually needed to get to the correct solution.
However, in Experiment 3 when no explicit organization was provided, the majority of
reasoners provided responses that were consistent with the superordinate value even though this
number was not explicitly provided in the problem description. In this case, it appears that
reasoners were (successfully) calculating the total sample size from the four subsets provided.
This suggests that reasoners were using cues from the problem presentation, such as the final
statement about considering a new sample of the same size, to determine which values they
thought were needed in the response.
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Calculations
Much of the existing literature suggests that computational difficulties make Bayesian
reasoning tasks inherently difficult, particularly for those with low numerical skill compared to
those with higher numeracy (Chapman & Liu, 2009; Reyna & Brainerd, 2008; Schwartz,
Woloshin, Black, & Welch, 1997; Talboy & Schneider, 2018b). Further, even though some
argue that this basic addition operation is simple (Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, Girotto, Legrenzi, &
Caverni, 1999; Sloman et al., 2003), there is substantial evidence that many reasoners are unable
to complete this simple step to correctly solve the problem (Johnson & Tubau, 2015; Mayer,
2003; Reyna & Brainerd, 2008; cf. Schneider & Talboy, in progress). However, the difficulty is
not necessarily with the calculation itself, but with determining the relationship between different
subsets.
In problem solving, computation involves determining what is needed for solution,
selecting the relevant values from the problem description, and then applying the correct values
toward the solution (Schneider & Talboy, under review; Talboy & Schneider, 2018a). In this
process, reasoners are expected to have an existing body of knowledge that helps them recognize
which mathematical operation is appropriate for the question of interest. This also requires
analytic abilities to correctly interpret the meaning of values provided in the problem. Although
I did not attempt to evaluate each step required in computation, I did want to isolate the issues
directly related to calculating the correct denominator (i.e., adding two values together).
Separating out the issue of adding the two relevant subsets together from the larger
problem structuring issue was accomplished in Experiment 2. Responses of reasoners who read
congruent problem-question pairings in which the denominator could be selected directly from
the problem were compared to responses of those who read congruent problems in which the
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denominator had to be calculated by adding two subsets together. To our surprise, there was no
evidence to suggest that the added calculation step increased the difficulty of solving the
congruent problem-question pairing. Further, in Experiment 3, when reasoners were not
provided any organizing value, a large portion of reasoners who read congruent or incongruent
pairings actually calculated the superordinate value more often than any other value. This
suggests that reasoners can and do complete simple calculations when they are given statement
cues suggesting these are important values (such as the statement at the end of the problem
telling them to consider another sample of the same size).
The lack of a discernible difference in accuracy in the congruent pairings, regardless of
whether calculations were required or not, suggests that a simple addition step is not what is
inhibiting accuracy on these nested set problems. Instead, when reasoners are starting from a
problem that flows directly to the solution, the added calculation step may be viewed as a
nominal change that reasoners readily take on to correctly answer the question, but only when
starting from a problem structure that leads directly to the correct (or at least an obvious) solution
(see also, Schneider & Talboy, in progress). If the difficulty reasoners have is not the actual step
of adding values together, this suggests that the breakdown occurs in one of the other
prerequisites for computation (Schneider & Talboy, under review; Talboy & Schneider, 2018a)
or in the general process of understanding how nested subsets function in relation to one another.
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Conclusion
The purpose of the current research was to evaluate the effect of reference dependence
within Bayesian reasoning, and the extent to which reference dependence accounts for many of
the representational and computational difficulties associated with Bayesian reasoning tasks.
What may appear to be simple changes in how reasoning problems are presented can actually
fundamentally alter the way reasoners interpret and utilize problem information to determine
solutions. When reasoners are not sure what they need to determine the correct response, they
tend to utilize the values provided directly in the problem presentation. Which value they choose
will critically depend on the reference points they identify based on the problem structure and the
way the question is asked. When calculation is needed, the calculation step of summing values
does not in itself appear to be a hindrance to accuracy when reasoners are starting from a
problem presentation that maps directly to the question of interest. This again suggests the issue
is knowing which values are relevant and how to organize those values cognitively in order to
arrive at the correct solution.
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Appendix A: Experimental Conditions Map
Map of conditions across the three experiments.
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Appendix B: Example Bayesian Reasoning Problems
Example Problem Forms for Experiment 1
Incongruent Condition-Focus Problem – Partial Detail
To determine whether a woman is at risk of breast cancer, doctors conduct mammogram
screenings. Sometimes women test positive even when they should test negative or test negative
when they should test positive. Here is some information for a random sample of 10,000
women who had a mammogram:
In this sample of 10,000 women, 100 have breast cancer.
Of the 100 women who have breast cancer:
80 received a positive result on their mammogram.
Of the 9,900 women who do not have breast cancer:
990 received a positive result on their mammogram.
Imagine another random sample of 10,000 women who had a mammogram.
Congruent Test-Focus Problem – Partial Detail
To determine whether a woman is at risk of breast cancer, doctors conduct mammogram
screenings. Sometimes women test positive even when they should test negative or test negative
when they should test positive. Here is some information for a random sample of 10,000
women who had a mammogram:
In this sample of 10,000 women, 1,070 received a positive result on their mammogram.
Of the 1,070 women who received a positive result on their mammogram:
80 have breast cancer.
Of the 8,930 women who received a negative result on their mammogram:
20 have breast cancer.
Imagine another random sample of 10,000 women who had a mammogram.
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Incongruent Condition-Focus Problem – Full Detail
To determine whether a woman is at risk of breast cancer, doctors conduct mammogram
screenings. Sometimes women test positive even when they should test negative or test negative
when they should test positive. Here is some information for a random sample of 10,000
women who had a mammogram:
In this sample of 10,000 women, 100 have breast cancer.
Of the 100 women who have breast cancer:
80 received a positive result on their mammogram.
20 received a negative result on their mammogram.
Of the 9,900 women who do not have breast cancer:
990 received a positive result on their mammogram.
8910 received a negative result on their mammogram.
Imagine another random sample of 10,000 women who had a mammogram.
Congruent Test-Focus Problem – Full Detail
To determine whether a woman is at risk of breast cancer, doctors conduct mammogram
screenings. Sometimes women test positive even when they should test negative or test negative
when they should test positive. Here is some information for a random sample of 10,000
women who had a mammogram:
In this sample of 10,000 women, 1,070 received a positive result on their mammogram.
Of the 1,070 women who received a positive result on their mammogram:
80 have breast cancer.
990 do not have breast cancer.
Of the 8,930 women who received a negative result on their mammogram:
20 have breast cancer.
8,910 do not have breast cancer.
Imagine another random sample of 10,000 women who had a mammogram.
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Example Problem Forms for Experiment 2
Incongruent Condition-Focus Problem without Reference Class Totals
To determine whether a woman is at risk of breast cancer, doctors conduct mammogram
screenings. Sometimes women test positive even when they should test negative or test negative
when they should test positive. Here is some information for a random sample of 10,000
women who had a mammogram:
In this sample of 10,000 women:
Of those who have breast cancer:
80 received a positive result on their mammogram.
20 received a negative result on their mammogram.
Of those who do not have breast cancer:
990 received a positive result on their mammogram.
8910 received a negative result on their mammogram.
Imagine another random sample of 10,000 women who had a mammogram.
Congruent Test-Focus Problem without Reference Class Totals
To determine whether a woman is at risk of breast cancer, doctors conduct mammogram
screenings. Sometimes women test positive even when they should test negative or test negative
when they should test positive. Here is some information for a random sample of 10,000
women who had a mammogram:
In this sample of 10,000 women:
Of those who received a positive result on their mammogram:
80 have breast cancer.
990 do not have breast cancer.
Of those who received a negative result on their mammogram:
20 have breast cancer.
8910 do not have breast cancer.
Imagine another random sample of 10,000 women who had a mammogram.
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Example Problem Forms for Experiment 3
Incongruent Condition-Focus Problem with Superordinate Set Organization
To determine whether a woman is at risk of breast cancer, doctors conduct mammogram
screenings. Sometimes women test positive even when they should test negative or test negative
when they should test positive. Here is some information for a random sample of 10,000
women who had a mammogram:
In this sample of 10,000 women:
80 have breast cancer AND received a positive result on their mammogram.
20 have breast cancer AND received a negative result on their mammogram.
990 do not have breast cancer AND received a positive result on their mammogram.
8910 do not have breast cancer AND received a negative result on their mammogram.
Imagine another random sample of 10,000 women who had a mammogram.
Congruent Test-Focus Problem with Superordinate Set Organization
To determine whether a woman is at risk of breast cancer, doctors conduct mammogram
screenings. Sometimes women test positive even when they should test negative or test negative
when they should test positive. Here is some information for a random sample of 10,000
women who had a mammogram:
In this sample of 10,000 women:
80 received a positive result on their mammogram AND have breast cancer.
990 received a positive result on their mammogram AND do not have breast cancer.
20 received a negative result on their mammogram AND have breast cancer.
8910 received a negative result on their mammogram AND do not have breast cancer.
Imagine another random sample of 10,000 women who had a mammogram.
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Incongruent Condition-Focus Problem with No Explicit Organization
To determine whether a woman is at risk of breast cancer, doctors conduct mammogram
screenings. Sometimes women test positive even when they should test negative or test negative
when they should test positive. Here is some information for a random sample of women who
had a mammogram:
80 have breast cancer AND received a positive result on their mammogram.
20 have breast cancer AND received a negative result on their mammogram.
990 do not have breast cancer AND received a positive result on their mammogram.
8910 do not have breast cancer AND received a negative result on their mammogram.
Imagine another random sample of the same number of women who had a mammogram.
Congruent Test-Focus Problem with No Explicit Organization
To determine whether a woman is at risk of breast cancer, doctors conduct mammogram
screenings. Sometimes women test positive even when they should test negative or test negative
when they should test positive. Here is some information for a random sample of women who
had a mammogram:
80 received a positive result on their mammogram AND have breast cancer.
990 received a positive result on their mammogram AND do not have breast cancer.
20 received a negative result on their mammogram AND have breast cancer.
8910 received a negative result on their mammogram AND do not have breast cancer.
Imagine another random sample of the same number of women who had a mammogram.
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Appendix C: Institutional Review Board Approval and Informed Consent
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INFORMED CONSENT
First, I’m going to explain to you what your participation in this study entails
and then ask if you want to participate. Keep in mind that you do not have
to participate if you don’t want to. The name of the PI is Alaina Talboy. The
USF IRB number for this research is Pro20889. This study will take
approximately 60 minutes, and completion of the study will earn you 2
points. If you decide to withdraw or you are excused by the experimenter,
points will be awarded based upon the time you spent in the study. You
also have the option of completing a different study listed on SONA to earn
2 points.
Today you will be participating in a study at the University of South Florida
that is concerned with how well people understand information about risks.
In this study, you will be randomly assigned to one of several conditions. In
each condition, you are going to be presented a series of general questions
about aspects of your numerical and graphical abilities. You will then be
asked a series of questions that concern potential real-life situations
involving risk. We want to know how you evaluate the risks in those
situations. You may also be asked to provide general demographic
information.
Your name will not be associated with any of your study responses. In fact,
we will not be asking for written consent, but we will need verbal consent
from you. In this way, your privacy and research records will be kept
confidential to the extent of the law. Authorized research personnel,
employees of the Department of Health and Human Services, the USF
Institutional Review Board and its staff, and any other individuals acting on
behalf of USF, may inspect the records from this research project. The
records will be anonymous.
It is possible, although unlikely, that unauthorized individuals could gain
access to your responses. Confidentiality will be maintained to the degree
permitted by the technology used. No guarantees can be made regarding
the interception of data sent via the Internet. However, your participation in
this online survey involves risks similar to a person’s everyday use of the
Internet. If you complete and submit an anonymous survey and later
request your data be withdrawn, this may or may not be possible as the
researcher will be unable to extract anonymous data from the database.
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The results of this study may be published. Your data will be combined
with data from others in the publication. The published results will not
include your name or any other information that would personally identify
you in any way.
This project presents no risk or harm to you, and there are no anticipated
benefits to you. If you have any questions or concerns regarding the
research, a written copy of this verbal agreement along with contact
information for the principal investigator and the IRB office can be provided
to you at your request.
Your participation in this experiment is entirely voluntary, and you may
leave at any time should you feel uncomfortable with the procedures. Your
decision to participate or not to participate will not affect your status or
course grade.

